The Belgrade tightrope: How Serbia’s president balances friendship with Moscow and support for Zelensky

Until recently, Aleksandar Vučić was more than welcome in the Kremlin. However, the Serbian president clearly no longer believes Russia will score a decisive enough victory to force him to sever contacts with Kyiv. Had he thought otherwise, Volodymyr Zelensky would not have found himself in Belgrade earlier this month for a round of closed-door talks with his Serbian counterpart. In their public statements, both leaders confirmed their mutual recognition of one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and they signaled that they are also contemplating the post-war future of their relationship.

The two sides left the key question of military cooperation unanswered, though reports did emerge on the eve of the meeting about a possible Serbian-Ukrainian drone development project, potentially funded by the UAE. Indirect military cooperation between Belgrade and Kyiv has been a focus of media scrutiny in recent years. According to the Financial Times, by mid-2024 the total value of Serbian weapons and ammunition that had found its way to Ukraine was around €800 million — even if in May 2025 Vučić denied the reports of military supplies after Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service accused Serbia’s defense industry of “trying to shoot Russia in the back.”

For some analysts, it is clear that Zelensky’s visit to Belgrade would not have taken place had Washington and other Western countries not believed Ukraine had reached a turning point in the war. Russian authorities, for their part, sought to minimize the significance of the Serbian-Ukrainian summit through their propaganda media. Officially, however, Moscow shifted the focus away from the meeting itself to a controversial remark by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung journalist Michael Martens. At a press conference in Belgrade, Martens asked Zelensky how Europeans can “help kill more Russians” — a remark that, predictably, drew an angry rebuke from the Russian embassy in Germany.

The FAZ editorial team quickly distanced itself from the “ambiguous phrasing,” stating that the question did not reflect the outlet’s editorial policy. But in the days that followed, the scandal only grew. The Russian embassy in Germany threatened Martens with prosecution through German and Russian law enforcement agencies. And indeed, on Aug. 15, criminal proceedings were opened against Martens in Russia on charges of incitement of hatred or enmity, which carry a sentence of up to six years in prison.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova also condemned the world’s “vaunted human rights activists and humanists” over their deafening silence in response to Martens’s words. “For the so-called civilized world,” Zakharova said, “this Nazi grandchild said exactly what they all think — he just didn’t call it ‘inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia,’ but literally ‘killing Russians.’” 

The Moscow press picked up on the tone set by Zakharova and did its best to minimize the significance of Zelensky’s visit. The business outlet Kommersant, for instance, described the trip as an event “of a pre-electoral nature,” crowned only by the signing of a memorandum of understanding on agriculture.

The picture was rounded out by fringe Serbian politicians with negligible ratings, who told Russian state media that “the West is waging war against Russia,” that Serbs can only join the EU “as a humiliated nation,” and that the Ukrainian leader’s visit to Belgrade had “shaken” Vučić’s position ahead of a snap parliamentary vote coming up in October.

In short, Moscow signaled its lack of intention to make an original diplomatic move. The Russian Foreign Ministry had already made clear its attitude toward senior Kyiv officials being received in Serbia a month earlier, following the visit to Belgrade by Ukrainian parliament speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk.

At the time, Moscow complained that “hostile anti-Russian escapades had not received an appropriate response from the Serbian hosts.” It follows that by receiving Zelensky shortly afterwards, the “Serbian hosts” chose to ignore their Russian partners’ displeasure.

Moscow is not in a position to derail such contacts, but the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry almost certainly understand that excessive pressure on Belgrade would push it further toward Kyiv and the West. In this sense, the scandal around the German journalist came at just the right moment, as it allowed Russian diplomacy to signal displeasure without directly attacking Vučić.

Despite Belgrade’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin has failed to halt the development of Serbia’s ties to Ukraine, let alone to make it an anti-Ukrainian ally. Zelensky’s visit, accompanied by constant reminders in the Western press about the indirect military cooperation between Belgrade and Kyiv, is a rather vivid illustration of this fact.

Contrary to some assessments, the warm reception given to Zelensky in Belgrade is not a simple “election stunt” aimed at reassuring Brussels and pro-European voters. The visit was planned long in advance and with considerable care — not to mention that Serbia’s official election campaign had not yet begun.

Absent any election, political contacts between Belgrade and Kyiv have been intensifying in recent years. These have included meetings between Vučić and Zelensky on the sidelines of international summits, visits by senior Ukrainian officials — among them Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba — and two trips by Vučić to Ukraine in just over a year.

It became clear that an official meeting with Zelensky was in the works during the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka to Belgrade in May, when Serbia’s leadership confirmed its readiness to accelerate work on a free trade agreement. Incidentally, the visit was timed with the first-ever NATO-Serbia military exercises on Serbian soil. Notably, Serbia has not conducted military exercises with Russia since 2022.

Although Zelensky’s visit does not fundamentally alter Serbia’s foreign policy, it has been one of the diplomatic highlights in the Balkans in recent years. The visit confirmed that Serbia, despite its traditional ties to Russia — both at the political level and via the energy sector — is willing to maintain a dialogue with Ukraine.

The Serbian authorities have no intention of making a distinct choice between Kyiv and Moscow. They are prepared to maintain humanitarian assistance and closed-door contacts with Ukraine while refraining from joining the West’s sanctions campaign against Russia, which remains Serbia’s chief supplier of natural gas.

Vučić’s critics characterize this stance as contradictory and duplicitous. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić recently accused the Serbian leader of double standards, posing a question to him on social media: “How is it that Serbia is one of the most important sources of weapons and ammunition for Ukraine, while sending one signal to Russia and a different one to Europe?”

For Vučić himself — the central figure in all key decision-making — this is not a contradiction but a convenient balancing act. He seeks to develop relations with competing powers while avoiding commitments that would foreclose other options. And in fact, Zelensky’s visit will help Belgrade expand its room for maneuver, preserving elements of its policy toward both Western countries and Russia. 

Vučić is demonstrating his usefulness to the EU and the U.S. during the war in Ukraine, all while stopping short of instituting a formal break with Russia. Some analysts see this as an attempt to win over the Trump administration by proving Serbia’s strategic value to Washington — an effort that has become increasingly visible with the launch of a U.S.-Serbia strategic dialogue in recent months.

In the past few years, Serbia’s foreign policy has been perceived as broadly pro-Russian — a perception that will persist even after Zelensky’s visit. A study by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy found that the narrative portraying Ukraine as a puppet in a war between Russia and the West dominated Serbia’s pro-government press from early 2022 to mid-2025.

Echoing Kremlin rhetoric, Serbian government-controlled outlets portrayed Zelensky as an illegitimate president and Ukraine as a country subordinate to NATO and the West. Local tabloids amplified corruption scandals involving Zelensky’s entourage, writing that the entirety of Ukraine’s leadership was thoroughly compromised.

Many other facts about the Belgrade-Kyiv relationship were thus overshadowed — for example, the facts that Serbia has supported UN resolutions affirming Ukraine’s sovereignty, has taken in Ukrainian refugees, and has provided financial, humanitarian, and energy assistance that Serbian authorities estimate to be worth €60 million.

Following Zelensky’s visit, Vučić stated that Serbia had “lost nothing” by receiving the Ukrainian leader, and that “Ukraine has never been a hostile nation,” albeit while adding that Serbia “is not destroying its friendly relations with Russia.” Vučić reserves the key roles in the world for the United States and China, regarding the EU and Russia as less significant centers of power. Indeed, it is the strengthening of ties with Beijing and Washington that has been the main focus of official Belgrade’s efforts in recent years.

For Ukraine, whose main partners are in the European Union, Belgrade’s ambiguous geopolitical orientation presents no serious problems. Still, if Serbia’s pro-EU political opposition were to come to power in Belgrade, that would certainly represent a more favorable outcome for Kyiv.

For Russia, which claims serious influence in the Balkans and close ties with Serbia, the situation is more complicated. Belgrade’s rapprochement with Beijing and the rapid growth of Chinese investment have once again highlighted Russia’s limited capabilities, particularly during wartime. Beijing — which, unlike the Kremlin, does not demand a rejection of EU integration — has in effect replaced Moscow as Serbia’s key partner in the East.

Equally painful for Russia is Belgrade’s rapprochement with the United States and its bet on a strategic dialogue. All the more so since Washington’s new, more pragmatic strategy in the Balkans is aimed at displacing Russia from the region.